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This paper is motivated by the recent discussion on the need of market supervisors, 
regulators, and policy makers, to take into account the behavioral elements of market 
participant attitudes and psychological and cognitive biases when taking policy decisions. We 
contribute to the discussion by studying, for the first time, the relationship between 
conventional and unconventional central bank monetary policy and herd behavior in equity 
markets, and argue that the transmission channel, through which monetary policy may affect 
herd behavior, is economic expectations and investor sentiment. We combine a range of 
research methodologies to measure monetary policy, herd behavior, and their possible 
relation, and our results indicate that conventional and unconventional Fed monetary policy 
explains a significant percentage of US equity market herd behavior variance, while ECB 
monetary policy explains a lower percentage of Eurozone herding variance. Impulse 
Response Functions indicate that Fed’s conventional expansionary policy and non-standard 
policy reduces the levels of herding in the US equity market, while conventional ECB 
expansionary policy induces higher levels of herding in Spain and Italy. We also detect spill-
over effects from Fed monetary policy to EU market herd behavior. 
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“…..by slightly increasing the price of leverage at an early stage of a developing boom, the 
central bank could break herding behaviour when the development of a bubble depends on 
investors observing other investors purchasing the bubble-prone asset”1 
Lucas Papademos  
Vice President of the ECB (2009) 
 
 
“There is a well-developed empirical literature on herding among fund managers in their 
portfolio allocations, but, as far as I know, this work has not looked at how such herding 
responds to changes in the monetary policy environment. So, this avenue seems like a 
potentially promising one to pursue” 2 
Jeremy C Stein 




This paper examines, for the first time, the relationship between conventional and 
unconventional central bank monetary policy and herd behaviour in equity markets. Although 
many studies examine either the effect of monetary policy on asset prices or herd behaviour 
in asset markets, no study examines their potential link. We use a range of research 
methodologies, such as the Qual VAR model of Dueker (2005) to capture the monetary 
policy stance of the Fed and the ECB, and a structural Factor-Augmented Vector 
AutoRegression model (see Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz, 2005; and Boivin, Giannoni, and 
Mihov, 2009) combined with 855 macro and 75 financial variables (a total of 930 variables) 
for the EU sample markets and 110 variables for the US market, to empirically examine 
whether central bank monetary policy has an impact on equity investor herd behaviour and, if 
so, whether it results to higher or lower levels of herding.  
 
 
1 Lucas Papademos, Vice President of the ECB, “Monetary policy and the ‘Great Crisis: Lessons and 
challenges”, Speech at the 37th Economics Conference “Beyond the Crisis: Economic Policy in a New 
Macroeconomic Environment” organized by the Österreichische Nationalbank, Vienna, 14, 2009. 
2 Comments on “Market Tantrums and Monetary Policy”, Speech by Mr Jeremy C Stein, Member of the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, at the 2014 Monetary Policy Forum, New York City, 28 February 
2014, available at: https://www.bis.org/review/r140303a.htm 
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The paper is motivated, and contributes to, the recent discussion on the need of market 
supervisors, regulators, and policy makers, to take into account the behavioral elements of 
market participant attitudes and psychological and cognitive biases, when taking policy 
decisions. For example, in a recent Consultation Paper, the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) recognizes that investors, or at least a significant number of them, may be 
subject to behavioural biases and heuristics and that their financial decisions might lead to 
sub-optimal outcomes.3 The consultation paper is addressed to authorities and firms subject 
to MiFID II, and the guidelines seek to implement enhanced provisions to ensure investor 
protection, such as updating the investor suitability assessment questionnaires to take into 
account clients’ behavioural biases.4 Another example is a recent IMF paper (Khan, 2018) 
which argues that regulators and market supervisors should incorporate behavioral expertise 
and complement regular supervision with behavioral supervision and apply behavioral 
knowledge to policy development and financial regulation (p.30).5 Khan argues that 
monetary policy is also the topic of behavioral research and discusses, among others, the case 
of the central bank of the Netherlands (DNB) which is using a team of psychologists and 
sociologists to assist regular supervisors in day-to-day supervision. In addition, Papademos 
(2009)6 suggested that monetary policy may be an effective tool for the prevention of build-
up of imbalances and “irrational exuberance” periods in asset markets. 
  
In financial markets, herd behavior is an important behaviour element (Hwang and Salmon, 
2009) and refers to the process where market participants imitate each other’s actions, base 
 
3 Consultation Paper ESMA 13 July 2017 | 35-43-748, p.9. 
4 More specifically, according to the Consultation Paper, if the way questions for the suitability assessment are 
formulated does not consider cognitive and behavioural biases, the questionnaire may result to be unreliable 
(p.9-12). Examples of investor biases that should be assessed may include (page 10, footnote 10) 
representativeness, overconfidence and over-optimism, conservatism, availability bias, frame dependence and 
anchoring, mental accounting, regret aversion, loss aversion. 
5 Khan, A., (2018). A Behavioral Approach to Financial Supervision, Regulation, and Central Banking., 
International Monetary Fund Working Papers, WP/18/178. 
6 See footnote 1. 
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their financial decisions upon the actions of other participants, trade in the same direction, or 
exhibit an investment behaviour that converges to the consensus/average (see, Nofsinger and 
Sias, 1999; Avery and Zemsky, 1998; Welch, 2000; De Bondt and Forbes, 1999; Hirshleifer, 
and Teoh, 2003; Hwang and Salmon, 2004; among others). Devenow and Welch (1996) 
argue that herd behaviour requires some sort of a coordination mechanism or a significant 
signal (e.g. a significant price movement, observing the investments of colleagues).7 
Monetary policy actions may potentially play this role and send strong signals that may 
coordinate similar investor behaviour through at least two channels. Firstly, conventional and 
unconventional monetary policy announcements, through their informational content, can 
affect economic expectations and investor sentiment which, in turn, can lead investors to 
react simultaneously and in the same direction. The European Central Bank8 recognizes that 
the expectations transmission channel has gained importance during the recent period, while 
recent studies find that unconventional monetary policy has an impact on investor sentiment 
(Lutz, 2015; Galariotis et al. 2018; among others). For example, increased levels of central 
bank credibility may have a significant effect on price changes by shaping market 
participants expectations. Another potential channel through which central bank policies may 
induce herd behaviour is via the risk measurement/management models that are commonly 
employed for regulatory requirements, which may lead to similar investment decisions. For 
example, Kremer and Nautz (2013b) point out that the use of VaR models may have as a 
consequence common sell activity, since these models may “…..often force banks to close 
positions in volatile periods” (p.1678). Kremer and Nautz use data from Germany and show 
that institutional investor herding has a destabilizing effect on prices and that it is partly due 




8 The Monetary Policy of the ECB, 2011, p.61; http://www.ecb.europa.eu  
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This coordinated behavior of investors and cross-market herd behavior can increase volatility 
and threaten market stability (Tsionas, 2013) and, in addition, herd behaviour has been linked 
to fads and bubbles (Devenow and Welch, 1996; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Gleason et al., 
2004; among others). Thus, major central banks have strong incentives to pay attention to 
potential herd behaviour induced by their actions with the incentive here being twofold: 
while, on one hand, investor herding may eradicate the desired impact of a certain policy 
action, intensify financial instability and market volatility during a crisis period9 and create 
the need for further policy actions, on the other hand, monetary policy can also be employed 
to prevent the development of price bubbles.  
 
Consider, for instance, the case where the central bank aims at stabilizing asset prices and 
tackling price volatility; the informational content of its actions may simultaneously induce 
unintentional herd behaviour that could potentially destabilize prices and affect the 
operational and informational efficiency of asset markets. Investor reaction to public 
information may lead to unintentional herding (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001) and one 
way that this could occur is in situations where central bank communication and news 
announcements are subject to subjective or different interpretations by market participants 
and, as a result, may increase market uncertainty and volatility. Gaballo (2016) discusses this 
issue and argues that in cases where communication is not specific the main source of 
information about future events is the market, which in turn, increases uncertainty. The 
updating of information interpretation based on market reaction leads to market participants 
unintendedly reacting to noisy or exogenous price movements; a collective behaviour that 
 
9 For example, in the midst of the EU financial crisis, Olli Rehn, the then European Union Economic and 
Monetary Affairs Commissioner, while discussing the Irish financial aid-package (2011) suggested that herd 
behaviour may be partly responsible for market instability.  See Bloomberg  article: Neuger, J., and Kennedy, 
S., www.bloombeg.com/news/2010-11-29/ireland-s-eu-financial-rescue-fails-to-stem-contagion-as-spain-bonds-
drop.html. Note also that Galariotis, Rong, and Spyrou (2015) find that US equity investors herd during various 
crisis periods mainly on fundamental macro information releases. 
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may intensify price noisiness. Gaballo discusses the surprise announcement on May 22, 2013, 
that the Fed might narrow the scope of its QE policy and the subsequent release of the 
minutes of the FOMC meeting, which contained more specific information about the diverse 
opinions of the members on economic outlook and monetary policy. Gaballo points out that 
the result was a disagreement about the specific informational content of the communication 
and, in the period that followed, there was increased market turmoil. Note here that the 
release of fundamental information does necessarily lead to less market confusion and 
reduced uncertainty. Amador and Weill (2010) examine public information releases on 
productivity and monetary shocks and find, in cases of endogenous information structures, 
that information releases may result to increased uncertainty, compared to no information 
releases at all. In addition, the release of public information may result to several Pareto-
ranked equilibria, intensifying uncertainty and reduced welfare. Amador and Weill show that, 
when market participants learn from market prices, a public information release may result to 
increased uncertainty, and argue that this inefficiency can be eliminated by sufficiently 
precise information releases.  
 
Although the empirical evidence is mixed, many authors argue that herding can destabilize 
prices. Kremer and Nautz (2013) find that unintentional institutional investor herding may 
destabilize prices in the short-term, Choi and Sias (2009) report that institutional investor 
herd behaviour may drive market prices away from fundamental values, Xin, Shengmin, and 
Zheng (2018) find that mutual fund herding intensifies equity price crashes, Cai, et al (2018) 
report that while the actions of buy herds affect prices permanently, the actions of sell herds 
distort prices significantly but temporarily and point out that herding in the asset management 
industry may be an important channel through which amplified risk can be a threat to 




With regard to the recent financial crises in the US and the EU,  the complexity, magnitude, 
and intensity of the crises led major central banks to adopt several non-standard 
(unconventional) monetary policy tools in order to deal with market volatility, since standard 
policy tools were ineffective10 (see, among others, Fawley and Neely, 2013; Gambacorta, 
Hofman, and Peersman, 2014). These policies had significant international spill-over effects 
on both advanced and emerging economies and in various asset markets. For example, 
Mohanty (2014) notes that during monetary policy easing by major central banks the 
correlation between asset prices and interest rates increased internationally; Fratzscher, Lo 
Duca, and Straub (2016) find that ECB policies had a positive effect on advanced and 
emerging stock markets and confidence; Tillmann, (2016) finds that quantitative easing 
policies have a significant role in explaining emerging market capital inflows, stock prices, 
and exchange rates (see also Neely, 2015; Chen et al, 2016; among others). These results 
complement previous findings that monetary policy has an impact on asset returns and affect 
investor sentiment or risk aversion (see, among others, Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Kurov, 
2010; Bekaert, Hoerova, and Duca, 2013). 
 
As argued above, whether monetary policy affects herd behaviour in asset markets is an issue 
that has been neglected by the relevant literature. This paper aims to address this gap and 
examine the extend of the contribution of conventional and unconventional monetary policy 
measures adopted by the Fed and the ECB to equity market investor herd behavior in the US 
and major EU markets. More specifically, we examine the impact of monetary policy on 
herding for the US and the nine Eurozone countries that had adopted the Euro before the 
financial crisis, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, 
 
10 Official policy rates approached their zero lower bound in 2008: the Federal funds rate in December 16 was at 
the 0.00 - 0.25 range, while the ECB fixed rate (deposit facility, main refinancing operations) was at 0.25 in 
April 2009.   
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and Portugal, for the period May 2007 to December 2016.11 We exclude Ireland, Luxemburg, 
and Greece from the sample, since for these markets we do not have stock price data 
available to calculate the herding measures, after the application of the relevant filters (see 
below for a discussion). Thus, based on the above discussion, this paper aims to shed light on 
the following issues: (i) examine whether there is a monetary policy effect on herd behavior 
in financial markets, (ii) test for potential monetary policy effect asymmetries on herd 
behavior among different countries, (iii) examine asymmetric effects on herd behavior 
between the two central banks (ECB and Fed), and (iv) evaluate whether US monetary policy 
actions have an effect on EU financial market herd behavior. 
 
We combine a range of research methodologies to measure monetary policy, herd behavior, 
and their possible relation. For example, in order to measure the unconventional monetary 
policy stance of Fed and ECB we first construct a binary variable based on important 
monetary policy announcements. We then employ the Qual VAR model of Dueker (2005) 
and macroeconomic information from our sample countries to transform this variable to a 
continuous latent variable that captures central bank propensity to non-standard monetary 
policy. In a second stage, this latent variable enters a structural Factor-Augmented Vector 
AutoRegression (FAVAR) model combined with 855 macro and 75 financial variables (a 
total of 930 variables) for the EU sample markets and 110 variables for the US market (such 
as industrial production, unemployment, producer and consumer price indexes, short and long 
term interest rates, economic sentiment indicators, etc.) in order to examine its impact on 
herd behaviour. To test the robustness of our results and evaluate the ability of our variable to 
capture the effect of non-standard monetary policy, we also employ the Shadow Federal 
Funds Rate (see Wu and Xia, 2016) and the European Central Bank Shadow rate (see Wu and 
 
11 The rest of the Eurozone countries joined much later and well within our sample period, e.g. Cyprus joined in 
2008, Estonia in 2011, Latvia in 2014, Lithuania in 2015, Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 2007, Slovenia in 2009. 
9 
 
Xia, 2017). Wu and Xia provide an approximation for a term structure model that can be 
utilized to synopsize the macroeconomic impact of non-standard monetary policy.12 
 
Following the continuously extending evidence on the importance of large data set 
implementation in macroeconomic modelling, we adopt a FAVAR model which has many 
advantages over more traditional approaches since it utilizes an extensive set of informational 
variables and combines factor analysis with VAR methodologies. For instance, Boivin and 
Giannone, (2008a) argue that large data set usage helps pinning down the effects of monetary 
policy shocks, a crucial issue when the time series dimension is relatively short. In addition, it 
can produce structural Impulse Response Function (IRFs) and deal with the omitted variables 
problem that is common in standard VAR analysis. It has been used in many previous studies 
in order to examine the transmission of monetary policy shocks or related issues (Stock and 
Watson, 2005; Favero, Marcellino, and Neglia, 2005; Belviso and Milani, 2006; Boivin and 
Giannoni, 2008b; Lutz, 2015; Gabriel and Lutz, 2015; Abbate, et al., 2016). For example, 
McCallum and Smets (2007) employ this methodology to examine the impact of monetary 
policy shocks on real wages and employment in the euro area as a whole, while Eickmeier 
(2009) uses the model to examine co-movement and heterogeneity in the Eurozone area.  
 
In contrast to many previous studies that use data for one single country, we approach the 
dimension issue differently and employ the same data set across nine EU countries and then 
identify the common components from a large cross section of national series and 
regional/global series (see also, Belke and Osowski, 2019; Galariotis et al. 2018). This 
approach is also motivated by the results of Georgiadis (2015) who shows that, compared to 
bilateral VAR models, multi-country modelling with methodologies such as the FAVAR and 
 
12 See Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta at https://www.frbatlanta.org/cqer/research/shadow_rate.aspx?panel=1. 
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GVAR is more appropriate for modelling regional and global shocks as well as spill-over 
effects across countries.  
 
To measure herd behaviour, we employ the comprehensive herd behaviour13 measure of 
Hwang and Salmon (2009). An important advantage of this non-parametric methodology, 
which is based on the cross-sectional variation of systematic risk (beta-herding), is that it 
takes into account the dynamic features of herd behavior and treats herding as a time-varying 
rather than a static process. Hwang and Salmon argue that behavioral biases, such as herding 
toward the consensus, may affect investors perception of the standard asset pricing 
equilibrium and, consequently, estimated betas will deviate from the traditional risk-return 
relationship. Thus, a herding measure, based on beta deviation from equilibrium, can be 
constructed. Our sample consists of all listed stocks (major securities and primary quotes) for 
the NYSE, Vienna Stock Exchange, Euronext Brussels, Helsinki Stock Exchange, Euronext 
Paris, Frankfurt Stock Exchange, Euronext Amsterdam, Madrid-SIBE, Milan Stock 
Exchange, and Euronext Lisbon. We exclude financials (Industry Classification Benchmark 
Code: 8000) and foreign companies and stocks with negative or missing values.  
 
Our results suggest that about 10% of the US herd behavior variance is explained by 
conventional Fed monetary policy, while non-standard policy explains about 15%; when we 
replace our unconventional monetary policy variable with the shadow Fed funds rate this 
increases to 24.4%. ECB conventional policy explains about 5% - 10% of herd behavior 
variance in Eurozone countries, while non-standard monetary policy explains a higher 
percentage of herding variance for Portugal, Germany, Finland, France, and the Netherlands. 
We also detect a spill-over effect of Fed policy: conventional Fed policy seems to have a 
 
13 For recent reviews on herding, testing methodologies, and empirical results see, among others, Kallinterakis 
and Gregoriou (2017), and Spyrou (2013). 
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significant impact on herd behavior volatility for Spain (it explains about 15.2% of herd 
behavior variance), while unconventional Fed policy has an impact on herding volatility for 
Portugal (21.7%) and the Netherlands (15.9%). Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) indicate 
that the conventional expansionary policy and non-standard policy adopted by the Fed 
reduces the levels of herding in the US equity market. Conventional ECB expansionary 
policy induces higher levels of herding in Spain and Italy, while shocks to non-standard ECB 
policy reduce herd behavior in the majority of the Eurozone markets. 
 
As argued above, a main transmission channel for this effect could be the expectations 
transmission channel; for example, increased levels of central bank credibility may have a 
significant effect on price changes by shaping market participants expectations. This is also 
consistent with previous findings that both conventional and unconventional monetary policy 
measures by the Fed tend to increase sentiment in the US (Lutz, 2015). In other words, since 
evidence indicates that monetary policy uses the confidence and expectations channel that has 
an impact on investor sentiment, and at the same time herd behavior is often closely related 
and affected by sentiment, the channel through which policymakers could affect herd 
behavior in financial markets could be through confidence and investor sentiment. More 
specifically, there is a documented link between central bank monetary policy actions and 
information communication and market expectations and sentiment (see, among others, 
Galariotis, Makrichoriti, and Spyrou, 2018; Lutz, 2015). For example, in a recent study, 
Schmeling and Wagner (2019) find that even the tone in central bank communication affects 
market participant expectations about future interest rates. More specifically, Schmeling and 
Wagner study the statements of ECB press conferences and show that another important 
factor that may affect asset prices, via a risk-based channel, is the tone of the communication 
of central banks. This result is robust even after controlling for policy actions, fundamentals, 
12 
 
and other features of communication. They show that when the tone in a communication is 
positive, there are increases in stock prices and decreases in volatility risk premia and 
spreads. Furthermore, Altavilla and Giannone (2017), who analyse professional forecaster 
assessments following non-standard policy announcements by the Fed, argue that their 
findings indicate that these measures had an effective and persistent impact on market 
participant expectations. As discussed above, central banks recognize the importance of this 
expectations transmission channel for their monetary policy (see also, Fratzscher, Lo Duca, 
and Straub, 2014). 
 
At the same time many studies document the effect of investor expectations and sentiment on 
asset prices (Neal and Wheatley, 1998; Baker and Wurgler, 2006; among others). Barberis, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), and Hong and 
Stein (1999) discuss formal models on how investor sentiment can affect asset prices and the 
behavior of investors. Furthermore, market expectations and sentiment can lead to correlated 
investor behavior. For instance, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) point out investors 
may herd not only because they all face similar information about fundamentals but also 
because they face similar non-rational changes in individual investor sentiment, while 
Kremer and Nautz (2013) argue that intentional herding, i.e. the imitation of the behavior of 
other investors without regard to own prior beliefs, is more sentiment-driven. Moreover, 
Schmeling (2009), who examines 18 equity markets from industrialized countries, finds that 
the impact of sentiment on returns is higher for countries that are more culturally predisposed 
to herd-like investment behavior. Our results have implications for the way central banks 
communicate policy decisions since communication has a role to play in shaping expectations 
(for a discussion see Blinder et al, 2008) and may affect market participant heuristics-based 
decision making by sending strong signals that may increase or decrease the coordination of 
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similar investor behaviour. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 discusses 
the data and the testing methodologies, section 3 presents the results, whilst section 4 
concludes the paper.  
 
2. Methodology and Data  
 
2.1 Non-standard Monetary Policy: A Qual VAR procedure  
 
In order to measure the impact of unconventional policy measures on investor herding we 
first construct a variable that captures the effect of these policies on economic activity. To do 
so we use significant Fed and ECB announcements related to non-standard monetary policy 
to construct a binary variable that takes the value of one during a month where Fed and ECB 
announced and important policy, and zero otherwise. These announcements cover the period 
between 2008 and 2016 and are identified from central bank press releases, Falagiarda, 
McQuade, and Tirpák (2015), Fratzscher et al. (2014), and Fratzscher et al. (2013). The 
announcements are presented in Appendix A for US unconventional policy and Appendix B 
for Eurozone unconventional policy.  
 
We next use the Qual VAR model of Dueker (2005) to transform this binary variable to a 
continuous latent variable (see also, Galariotis, Makrichoriti, and Spyrou, 2018). The Qual 
VAR model is linked to the single-equation dynamic ordered probit model (Eichengreen, 
Watson, and Grossman 1985; Dueker, 1999) and allows the derivation of the latent variable 
following the estimation of the model with Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) procedures. 
This way we are able to employ non-standard policy announcements as an endogenous factor 
in a VAR system. In this setting, all variables comprise the same VAR system, and the only 
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variable required to yield multi-step forecasts is the dependent variable's own history (see 
also, Meinusch and Tillmann, 2016; Assenmacher-Wesche and Dueker, 2010; Tillmann, 
2015; Bordo, Dueker, Wheelock, 2008; Amstad, Assenmacher-Wesche, and Dueker, 2008).  
 
To describe the model more formally, consider that 𝑦∗ is a latent variable that is an 
autoregressive process of order ρ depending on constant δ, a set of explanatory variables 
𝑋𝑡−𝛲 (lagged), and its own lagged values, as in equation (1) below.  In (1) φ and β are vectors 
of coefficient and 𝑒𝑡 is the random error term from a standard normal distribution; 
 
              𝑦𝑡




∑ 𝛽𝑙𝑋𝑡−𝑙 + 𝑒𝑡
𝜌
𝑙=1
,        𝑒𝑡 ~𝑁(0,1).                                     (1) 
 
In (1), t is the time index, 𝑦𝑡 is a binary variable takes the value unity when a non-standard 
policy announcement occurs in period t and zero otherwise. The variable 𝑦𝑡 takes the form: 
                                             𝑦𝑡 = {
0      𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑡
∗ ≤ 0
1      𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑡
∗ ≥ 0 
                                                               (2) 
 
The second component of the model is a VAR (ρ) process that captures the dynamics of k 
regressors: 




𝑌𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜈𝑡,         𝜈𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝛴)                                            (3) 
 
In (3) 𝑌𝑡 = (𝑋𝑡, 𝑦𝑡
∗)′ is a k ×1 vector, while k −1 time series of observations (we use 
macroeconomic data) constitute 𝑋𝑡, and 𝑦𝑡
∗ complements a vector of the latent variable. μ is a 
k ×1 vector of constants while 𝜈𝑡 is the k ×1 error vector and Σ is the covariance matrix of 
errors. The VAR coefficients are: 
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]                          (4) 
         
The complete system is derived from the linear relation among the latent variable and the 
regressors and is estimated with MCMC techniques and Gibbs Sampling (see Dueker, 2005; 
Assenmacher-Wesche and Dueker, 2010). Thus, we can sample from the conditional 
distribution to generate posterior samples by sweeping through each variable, or block of 
variables, and at the same time keep the rest of the variables fixed at current values. This 
procedure permits the joint estimation of the coefficients Φ, and Σ, the latent variable 𝑦𝑡
∗, and 
the covariance matrix of residuals. The mean and variance of the states (the latent variable) is 
obtained with Kalman Smoothing, and an iterative algorithm generates the draws, while OLS 
coefficients estimates and initial values (given the binary data) are employed to obtain the 
latent variable, 𝑦𝑡
∗ (drawn from the truncated Normal for each period and based on the first 
and the second moment).  
 
The final step involves estimating the VAR model, employing the sampled time series of the 
latent variable and the OLS estimates of Φ and Σ (denoted, respectively, as ?̂? and ?̂?). The 
OLS covariance is defined from this information in conjunction with the assumed Jeffrey's 
prior, a draw with T − k degrees of freedom for Σ from the inverted Wishart distribution:    
 
                                                  𝛴 ~ 𝐼𝑊 {((𝛵?̂?)
−1
, 𝑇 − 𝑘}                                                 (5) 
 
In (5), T is the number of observations, while k is the number of explanatory variables 
((𝛵?̂?)−1). Since the variance of the latent variable (𝑦𝑡
∗) is unity, we equally adjust the 
appropriate element in Σ and normalize the other elements in the relevant column. OLS 
16 
 
estimates mean is then added to a draw following a multivariate Normal distribution, (with 
the Kronecker product as the covariance matrix), and draws for Φ, given Σ, are obtained from 
the draw for Σ and (Y′Y)−1: 
 
                                                    𝛷 ~ 𝛮 { 𝛷,̂ 𝛴 ⊗ (𝑌′𝑌)−1 }                                         (6) 
 
We run 10,000 iterations for the Gibbs sampling and discard the first 5,000 iterations in order 
to allow for convergence to the posterior distribution (Dueker, 2005). The draws of 
coefficients that do not satisfy stationarity are rejected and then resampled and from the 
resulting sample we obtain the latent variable and the VAR coefficients. In the Qual VAR 
system, the binary index is entered as 𝑦𝑡{0, 1} and along with the rest of the variables in the 
𝑋𝑡 vector is used for the derivation of central bank latent tendency to unconventional 
monetary policy, 𝑦𝑡
∗ (y*). The model is estimated in first differences and for the recursive 
ordering we follow Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999).  
 
For the lag length, we use three lags as more appropriate for shorter samples, since criteria for 
the selection of the lag structure are not defined for binary data (Meinusch and Tillmann, 
2016; Tillmann, 2016). The choice of three lags in the Qual VAR model, allows, on the one 
hand, for well-behaved residuals by including enough lags and, on the other hand, the 
reduction of the dimensionality of the model and reduction of the instability of the MCMC 
estimation. We believe that three lags are sufficient since our analysis includes detrended 
growth rates and logarithmic differences (Chen et al. 2017); note, however, that the results 




The variables that we include in this model capture the business climate, economic 
expectations, and stock market conditions in the US and the Eurozone sample countries.14 We 
follow Lutz (2015) and use industrial production excluding Construction (IP), the 
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HIPC), stock market returns and the Economic 
Sentiment Indicator (ESI) for all the sample countries. When adding in the system the 
unemployment rate (UE) and Trade Balance (TB) the results remain qualitatively the same 
(see also, Galariotis. Makrichoriti, and Spyrou, 2018). For the US we use industrial 
production excluding Construction (IP), the Consumer Price Index (CPI), stock market 
returns and the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI). We employ monthly data on 
sentiment indicators, financial variables, and macroeconomic aggregates. All data cover the 
period between May 2007 and December 2016, are obtained from Thomson Reuters Eikon 
and Bloomberg. Figures 1 to 3 present the resulting continuous variable that captures central 
bank tendency to unconventional monetary policy for each sample country (dash line); the 
announcements are reflected with the shaded areas.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Note that we may expect differences between conventional and nonconventional policies in 
terms of herd behavior due to the different nature of these policies. For instance, 
unconventional policies are usually implemented in crises periods when conventional policies 
have exhausted their use. In a recent study with eurozone countries, Kucharčuková, Claeys, 
 
14 Note that there are some differences in the number of variables included in our analysis between the EU and 
US FAVAR dataset, due to differences in the availability of the data. Moreover, since we use a balanced panel 
for the EU, we had to deal with the availability of variables across countries and match each country-specific 
dataset with the US dataset. 
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and Vašíček (2016) find that with non-standard measures, compared to conventional 
measures, prices react quickly, but other variables, such as output, react softly. Apart from 
this, monetary policy transmission mechanism asymmetries among different countries has 
been evidenced by several previous studies (Barigozzi Conti and Luciani, 2014; Clausen and 
Hayo, 2006; Ehrmann, 1998; Chen, 2007; Napolitano, 2006; among others). 
 
More specifically, with unconventional policy we mean the policies used during the recent 
financial crises. During the financial crisis in the US (2007-2009) conventional policy 
measures, such as setting a target for interbank money market rates and then through open 
market operations modifying the supply of money by the central bank became ineffective in 
affecting money market liquidity, since main policy rates reached their lower bound. In order 
to restore liquidity conditions and tackle market volatility central banks resorted to non-
conventional monetary policies which differs from conventional policies mainly because with 
these policies central banks attempt to affect prices and market conditions by actively 
managing their balance sheet. For instance, with the Enhanced Credit Support (ECS) the ECB 
mainly extended the maturity of liquidity provisions in Longer-Term Refinancing Operations, 
the LTROs (Supplementary Long-Term Refinancing Operations (SLTROs), and “Very” 
Long Term Refinancing Operations (VLTROs)). Also, it proceeded with direct purchases 
from secondary markets of government securities with the Securities Markets Programme 
(SMP), and then with the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs), i.e. purchases of 
government securities issued by countries under a European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
adjustment programme. The Fed resorted to Quantitative Easing (QE): its balance sheet 
before the crisis contained about 700-800 billion $ of Treasury notes; by June 2010 it 





2.2. Measuring Herd Behavior 
 
Herd behaviour, may be intentional, i.e. market participants intentionally disregard their own 
private information and follow the herd (e.g. assuming that previous traders possess superior 
information), or spurious (unintentional), i.e. market participants take similar decisions 
because they face the same information set (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001). Hwang and 
Salmon (2009) find that herd behavior occurs in both bear and bull markets and that during 
periods of unanticipated shocks and crises herd behavior disappears. 
 
Empirical evidence indicates that institutional investors have the tendency to follow each 
other’s trades not only in the US but also in international asset markets (see, Sias, 2004; Choi 
and Sias, 2009; Holmes, Kallinterakis, and Ferreira, 2013; Kremer and Nautz, 2013; among 
others). For example, Choi and Skiba (2015) examine 41 countries and find that institutional 
herd behaviour is more pronounced in markets that exhibit high level of information 
transparency;15 while Chen (2013) reports evidence of significant herd behaviour in a sample 
of 69 countries.16 This behaviour does not necessarily lead to superior performance; Koch 
(2017) finds that it is leader mutual funds (i.e. funds whose trades lead the trades of other 
funds) that exhibit superior performance, while Wei, Wermers, and Yao (2015) report 
superior performance for contrarian approaches, i.e. funds that trade against the herd; these 
results are suggesting the possession of superior private information.  
 
 
15 The authors argue that this is consistent with the notion that herd behavior may be driven by fundamental 
information. Also note that, Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2014) show that changes in analyst recommendations 
have an impact on mutual fund herding especially following negative information and mainly for fund managers 
with the higher career concerns. 
16 Galariotis, Krokida, and Spyrou (2016) find macro information induced herd behaviour in EU sovereign bond 
markets during the EU crisis, while Cai, et al (2018) find a much higher level of institutional herding in the 
corporate bond market compared to equity markets. 
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In order to measure the level of herding activity we follow the methodology introduced by 
Hwang and Salmon (2009). An important feature of their herding measure is that it can 
capture investor herding as a time-varying phenomenon. Their approach is based on the 
rationale that investors suppress their beliefs regarding equilibrium which is subsequently 
reflected on individual stock betas that converge (beta herding). More specifically, the 
following equation (7) presents the relationship between the beta in asset pricing equilibrium 
(𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑡) and the biased beta (𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑏 ) (see, Hwang and Salmon, 2004):  
 





𝑏 = 𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑡 − ℎ𝑚𝑡(𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑡 − 1)                                      (7) 
 
In (7), rmt and rit are the market return and the excess returns of asset i at time t, respectively, 
and Et(.) is the expectation operator conditional on the information set at time t.  The 
mispricing due to cross-sectional bias is reflected in the superscript b, and the level of herding 
in betas due to the mispricing is hmt. It follows that, (i) when hmt is equal to 0, prices are in 
equilibrium and there is no herd behavior, (ii) when hmt is between zero and unity (0<hmt<1) 
there is evidence of herd behavior towards the consensus, (iii) when hmt is negative (hmt<0) 
we have adverse herding, and (iv) when hmt equals one (hmt=1) perfect herd behavior is 
suggested, i.e. asset prices move towards the consensus (the market portfolio).  
 
Based on the above, beta deviation from equilibrium values serves as a framework for the 
construction of a measure that gauges herding activity in equity markets. Thus, Hwang and 
Salmon (2009) suggest that the distortion in betas consists of three components, herding, 
market sentiment and individual sentiment. Specifically, the bias in betas is expressed as 
follows: 
 𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑠 = 1 +
1
1+𝑠𝑚𝑡





𝑠  is the systematic risk which is biased due to sentiment, 𝑠𝑚𝑡 represents the level of 
market optimism or pessimism and 𝜔𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic sentiment. Νote that only in very 
few extreme situations where, 𝑠𝑚𝑡 = ℎ𝑚𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 0 and ℎ𝑚𝑡 = −𝑠𝑚𝑡, 𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑠  corresponds to 
the equilibrium beta (for details see, Hwang and Salmon, 2009).  Alternatively, betas would 
enclose a sentimental bias to a certain degree. Hence, there are two main forces that 
contribute to the distortion in betas (either individually or combined), i.e. biased expectations 
with respect to market sentiment concerning future returns and/or biased estimations 
depending on the market consensus while disregarding the systematic risk. 
 








𝑖=1                                (9) 
 
In (9), ?̂?𝑖𝑚𝑡
𝑠  is the estimated biased beta when cross sectional herd behavior takes place and Nt 













𝑖=1    (10) 
 
In (10) 𝜂𝑖𝑚
2  is the estimation error. Since cross sectional average estimation errors may bias 
𝐻𝑚𝑡, a standardized measure of beta herding is introduced in order to sufficiently capture 

















In (11), ?̂??̂?𝑖   is the standard error of ?̂?𝑖𝑚
𝑠  and 𝐻𝑚
∗  is computed as the cross-sectional variance 
of the t-statistics of the estimated coefficients on the market portfolio. One important issue in 
the implementation of the herding measure in (11) is the choice of the appropriate asset 
pricing model. In this paper, the four-factor asset pricing model of Carhart (1997) is 
employed, i.e. betas are adjusted, in addition to the market portfolio, for market 
capitalization, book to market values, and momentum (see also Fama and French, 1993). To 
proxy for the euro area risk-free rate we employ the 3-month German Treasury bill (Bubill) 
rate. The data are obtained on a monthly basis from Bloomberg. 
 
For the herding measure we follow Hwang and Salmon (2009) and employ a rolling sample 
of 36 observations (monthly) with a constant step of one month; we use the initial 36 monthly 
observations to obtain OLS beta estimates and t-statistics using Newey-West standard errors 
for each stock. More specifically, we use 36 monthly observations as follows: assume we 
start with February 2003 to January 2006, to obtain the beta and t-stat for January 2006. Next, 
we roll everything by one month, i.e. we use March 2003 to February 2006 to estimate the 
beta and t-stat for February 2006, and so on. We employ statistical trimming on the herding 
measure where we omit the 1% top and bottom standardized beta estimates, in order to 
mitigate the effect of outlier values (Hwang and Salmon, 2013), and consider the Carhart 
(1997) model since it is a widely accepted asset pricing model (Hwang and Salmon, 2009). In 
addition, since empirical betas may exhibit limitations (liquidity, microstructure issues, thin 
trading)17, we impose a number of criteria on sample stocks (for a more detailed discussion, 
see Hwang and Salmon, 2009). More specifically, for a stock to be included in the sample it 
must have available at least 60 past observations, its stock price must be above 1€ (i.e. we 
 




exclude ‘penny’ stocks), its turnover should be above the bottom 1%, its return volatility 
based on the past 60 observations (60 months) should not be in the top and bottom 1% of the 
sample (alternative cut-off points produce qualitatively similar results).18 
 
We employ the universe of stocks for each market. This means we include dead/suspended 
stocks but only keep major securities and primary quotes for all stock exchanges examined, 
i.e. the NYSE, Vienna Stock Exchange, Euronext Brussels, Helsinki Stock Exchange, 
Euronext Paris, Frankfurt Stock Exchange, Euronext Amsterdam, Madrid-SIBE, Milan Stock 
Exchange, and Euronext Lisbon. As discussed above, we apply several filters on this initial 
universe of stocks as in Hwang and Salmon (2009). For example, we exclude financial firms 
(Industry Classification Benchmark Code: 8000), foreign companies and stocks with negative 
stock prices, market to book ratio and/or missing values. We exclude NASDAQ stocks 
because of the differences in reported trading volumes and in line with the literature (see for 
example, Henry and Koski, 2017) in order to control for variation in microstructure across 
exchanges. However, we do include NASDAQ index in the FAVAR estimation to gauge the 
state of the equity market in US. We provide indicative descriptive statistics for the number 
of firms used in the herding measure for each country in Table D1 in APPENDIX D. That is, 
we present averages of the number of stocks included and the market capitalization and the 
number of shares traded (volume) included in the final sample for each equity market 
examined. For example, for Germany the average number of stocks included for the herding 
measure are 342, with an average firm market capitalization $1746,7 million. 
 
Figures 4 to 6 present the resulting herding measures for each sample country for the period 
between December 2005 and December 2016. The intuition here is that lower values of the 
 
18 For the sample markets, we obtain our monthly time series for each stock from Thomson Reuters Eikon. The 
following datatypes are used for each stock: equity price (P), total return (RI), market value (MV), number of 
shares (NOSH), trading volume (VO) and common equity (CEQ). 
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herding measure imply higher levels of herding activity. In other words, lower values imply 
smaller deviations from the consensus (i.e. high levels of herding) while higher values 
suggest large deviations from the consensus (i.e. low levels of herding). Note that herd 
behavior is not similar within Eurozone markets. For instance, in some markets there are 
significant fluctuations in herding levels (e.g. Austria, Germany) while in others herd 
behavior levels are more stable overtime with few peaks (e.g. France). In Germany the 
herding measure spikes in 2010-2011 and then again in 2016. These two spikes coincide with 
the beginning of the EU financial crisis with the fiscal problems in Greece and the bail-out 
agreements for Greece (May 2010), Ireland (November 2010), and Portugal (May 2011), and 
the result of the Brexit referendum (June 2016), respectively. Note also that between 2008 
and 2012 in some markets (e.g. Italy, Spain, Portugal) we observe higher levels of herding 
compared to before and after this period, while in other markets (e.g. Finland) we observe 
lower levels of herding. For the US it is notable that herd behavior was more prevalent for the 
period leading to the financial crisis (2006 -2008) rather than during (2008-2009) or 
afterwards, consistent with the findings of Hwang and Salmon (2009); in addition, for the US 
market (Figure 6) we observe much lower levels of herd behavior from 2010 onwards.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
2.3. The Effect of Monetary Policy on Herding: A FAVAR Approach  
 
In order to examine the effect of monetary policy on herding we employ a structural Factor-
Augmented Vector AutoRegression (FAVAR) model. The idea is that we include in the 
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model the latent variable that we derived from the Qual VAR estimation, which captures the 
propensity of ECB and Fed for non-standard (unconventional) monetary policy. We estimate 
the FAVAR model with a two-step principal component analysis (see, Bernanke Boivin, and 
Eliasz, 2005; Boivin et al., 2009). Initially, we employ a large set of variables and Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) to derive a set of factors that describe the dynamics of financial 
markets. More specifically, for the US FAVAR model we use 110 variables while for the EU 
FAVAR model we use 930 variables for the sample markets such as industrial production 
indexes, unemployment, producer and consumer price indexes, short and long-term interest 
rates, capacity utilization rate, money supply, GDP, unit labour cost, main stock price 
indexes, economic sentiment indicators, imports and exports. We also use world variables 
(oil price, S&P 500 Composite Index, VIX-CBOE volatility index, ECB Commodity price 
index) and aggregate euro-area variables (EUROSTOXX 50, Yen to EU exchange rate, EU to 
UK exchange rate, EU to USD exchange rate, VSTOXX, etc). Some time series are quarterly 
and have been disaggregated into monthly with cubic spline interpolation (see, among others, 
Abbate, et.al. 2016; Lescaroux and Mignon, 2009). The variables (except rates) are in log 
levels and if required differenced to achieve stationarity. The herding measures constructed 
are included in the FAVAR model together with macroeconomic and financial variables 
discussed above; the nine EU country-specific herding measures enter the EU FAVAR model 
while the US herding measure enters the US FAVAR model.  
 
Also, all variables employed to estimate the factors are standardised (zero mean, unit 
variance) to deal with the impair factor extraction issue that arises due to the different time 
series scales. For a list of the variables employed in the EU FAVAR model see Appendix C. 
These variables cover national accounts, prices, income and consumption, the labour market, 
monetary aggregates, interest rates, financial markets (i.e. bond, stock and credit markets) 
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and business conditions and the foreign exchange market. The dataset is augmented with EU 
aggregates and world aggregates. For the US FAVAR model we update the dataset from 
Boivin et al (2009) and Stock and Watson, (2004).19 We employ an extensive and balanced 
panel-dataset across EU countries and the US in order to increase the significance of the 
inferences made and to enable comparisons. 
 
In Appendix D we present indicative descriptive statistics for sample variables. Note that the 
total equity market capitalisation of the Eurozone markets in the third quarter of 2019 is 
approximately 7.3 trillion million Euro (see Table D1, Panel A, in Appendix D, for more 
details) while the sample markets examined in the paper have a combined equity market 
capitalisation of 6.9 trillion Euro (Table D1, Panel A); that is, they represent approximately 
94% of total Eurozone market capitalisation. The market cap of the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) by mid-2019 was approximately US$22.9 trillion (with a further US$10.8 
trillion for NASDAQ). The three largest Eurozone equity markets in terms of market 
capitalisation are France with a market cap of approximately 2.1 trillion Euro, Germany (1.7 
tr) and the Netherlands (1.1 tr). Spain has the highest average number of listed stocks 1856 
(see Table D1, Panel B) although it is the fourth largest market. Portugal is the smallest 
market with a market cap of approximately 54 billion and has the lowest average number of 
listed stocks (66). Also, southern Eurozone countries tend to have higher inflation rates, 
higher unemployment rates, and higher bond yields, compared to Core Eurozone countries 
(Table D1, Panel C). 
 
 
19 Due to lack of data we do not include Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Baker and Wurgler, 2007 Sentiment Index 
and Net Exchange Between Stock and Bond Mutual Funds. 
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The second step consists of estimating a VAR model where we also include the latent factors 
that capture unconventional policy as derived using the Qual VAR approach,20 the Federal 
Funds Rate (FFR, US) and the Main Refinancing Operations Rate (MRO, Eurozone) rate in 
the case where we investigate the conventional monetary policy effect (see also Galariotis, 
Makrichoriti, and Spyrou, 2018). More formally, suppose that 𝑁 × 1 is a vector of macro 
variables 𝑋𝑡, and that capital market dynamics are affected by a 𝐾 × 1 vector of (unobserved) 
factors (𝐹𝑡). Also, suppose that an observed factor 𝑅𝑡 exists such: 
 
                                                     𝐶𝑡 = [
𝐹𝑡
𝑅𝑡
]                                                                              (12) 
 
Using PCA the estimation of the observation equation is: 
 
                                    𝑋𝑡 = 𝛬
𝑓𝐹𝑡 + 𝛬
𝑟𝑅𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡                                                                (13) 
 
In (13) 𝛬𝑓 , is the 𝑁 × 𝐾 matrix of factor loadings, 𝛬𝑟 is the 𝑁 × 1 vector of factor loadings, 
and 𝑒𝑡  is he 𝑁 × 1 vector of error terms with zero mean. Then, we estimate the following 
standard VAR with the 𝐶𝑡: 
 
                                     𝐶𝑡 = 𝛷(𝐿)𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡                                                                       (14) 
 
In (14) 𝛷(𝐿) is the matrix of lag polynomials of finite order. In the next section, we present 
IRFs and the Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (FEVDs) from the model. We use 
Cholesky ordering, with monetary policy last in the ordering since we assume that it has an 
 
20 As the Qual VAR model was estimated for each of the nine countries separately, a principal component 
analysis (PCA) to the country specific latent propensities was conducted, in order to produce a latent propensity 




impact on the unobserved factors, 𝐹𝑡, with a lag. We report results with a lag length of three, 
and follow Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) and employ three factors in our model.21  
 
3. Results  
 
3.1. The Effect of Conventional Monetary Policy on Herding 
 
Table 1 presents the contribution of conventional monetary policy to the variance of the 
common component, i.e. the Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (FEVDs). The FEVDs 
are obtained via the estimation of a structural Factor-Augmented Vector AutoRegression 
(FAVAR) model with a two-step principal component analysis, as discussed above. For the 
US we use the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) to proxy for conventional monetary policy, while 
for the EU we use the Main Refinancing Operations (MRO) rate. The model is estimated with 
3 common factors for the period 2007-2016. The column titled FEVD reports the fraction of 
the variance of the forecast error explained by the policy shock. 𝑅2 refers to the fraction of 
the variance of the variable explained by the common factors, (𝐹𝑡 and 𝑅𝑡).  
 
The results suggest that for the US (Panel A) conventional Fed monetary policy explains an 
important proportion of the US herding variance (9.6%), the R2 indicates that the variables 
included in the model explain an important fraction (55.1%) of equity market herding 
variance for the US. The results in Panel B suggest that for many Eurozone markets standard 
monetary policy explains about 5% - 10% of herding variance. For example, conventional 
ECB policy shocks explain 9.1% of the variance in the herding measure for Spain, 7.6% for 
 
21 Our results remain qualitatively the same after adopting five or more factors and using different lag length, as 
discussed in the next section. Note that, although Bai and Ng (2002) suggest a criterion for the number of 
factors, Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) argue that the decision relies on the exploitation of the sensitivity 




Italy, 5.3% for France, 4.6% for the Netherlands (for the rest countries it is quite low. i.e. 
0.1% - 1.5%).  Note also that the fraction of the herding variance explained by the common 
macro factors (𝐹𝑡 and 𝑅𝑡)  is significantly higher mainly for Southern markets and the 
Netherlands: about 22% to 26% for Italy, Portugal, and France, 41% for Spain, and 62.4% for 
the Netherlands. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.2. The Effect of Unconventional Monetary Policy on Herding 
 
Table 2 is arranged in a similar manner as Table 1 and presents the contribution of 
unconventional monetary policy to the variance of the common component (FEVDs). Non-
standard monetary policy is measured, for each market, with the use of a binary variable 
based on significant Fed and ECB announcements related to non-standard monetary policy 
and its transformation to a continuous latent variable, denoted as y*, via the implementation 
of the Qual VAR model of Dueker (2005). Panel A presents the result for the US market: the 
FEVD suggests that Fed’s unconventional monetary policy, as captured by the y* variable, 
explains a significant fraction of US herd behavior variance (15.3%), while the respective R2 
is also important and equal to 55.1%. Panel B presents the results for the Eurozone markets. 
Compared to the results in Table 1 we observe that non-standard ECB monetary policy 
explains a higher percentage of herding variance compared to standard policy for Portugal 
(16.7% compared to 1.5%), for Germany (3.7% compared to 0.7%), for Finland (2.4% 
compared to 0.4%), and for the Netherlands (5.6% compared to 4.6%). At the same time, it 
explains a lower percentage for Spain (2.8% compared to 9.1%) and Italy (0.9% compared to 




[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.3. Spill-Over Effects 
 
This sub-section examines potential spill-over effects of Fed’s monetary policy on Eurozone 
equity market herd behaviour. Although monetary policy spill-over effects on herd behaviour 
have not been examined before, there is evidence to suggest that Fed monetary policy does 
affect international markets. For instance, Curcuru and Kamin (2018) find that conventional 
Fed policies exert greater international spill-overs than unconventional policies (such as QE), 
Albagli et al (2018) show that US monetary policy spill-overs to long-term yields have 
increased substantially after the global financial crisis, while Yang and Zhou (2017) report a 
significant contribution of Fed unconventional policy to international volatility spill-overs. In 
addition, Schmidt et al (2018) provide evidence on the impact of US and UK monetary policy 
shocks on domestic credit supply of French and Italian banks; Georgiadis (2015) documents 
that US monetary policy generates sizable output spill-overs to the rest of the world; Hanisch 
(2018) shows that US monetary policy has a substantial impact on individual EA economic 
and financial stability, with financial sector represented by bond, stock and credit markets 
serving as an active transmission channel. In order to detect potential US monetary policy 
spill-over effects, we employ the same FAVAR model as above for the Eurozone sample 
markets, except that instead of using ECB policy we use Fed standard (FFR) and non-
standard (y*) monetary policy. The results are presented in Table 3 and are arranged in the 
same manner as in the previous Tables.  
 
Conventional Fed policy (Panel A) seems to have a significant impact on herd behaviour 
volatility only for Spain (15.2%); for the rest of the Eurozone markets its impact is relatively 
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low although it appears to be higher for Finland and Portugal and lower for Italy when 
compared to the impact of ECB’s policy. For instance, conventional Fed policy explains 
about 2.3% for Finland, 4.4% for Italy, 4% for Portugal of the herding variance, while ECB 
policy explains 0.4%, 7.6% and 1.5%, respectively. The FEVD results for Fed’s 
unconventional monetary policy (Panel B) indicate that y* explains a significant fraction of 
herd behavior variance for Portugal (21.7%) and the Netherlands (15.9%). For the rest of the 
markets the contribution varies between 0.01% to 2% (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Spain, 
Germany), 5.2% for France, and 3.4% for Italy, fractions that are very close to the ones 
explained by ECB unconventional policy ( 0.1% for Austria, 1% for Belgium, 2.4% for 
Finland, 2.8% for Spain, 3.7% for Germany, 5.3% for France and 0.9% for Italy). The R2 
statistics are qualitatively similar to the ones reported above.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The results so far indicate that Fed’s conventional monetary policy contributes approximately 
10% to US equity market herd behaviour variance, while unconventional policy has a more 
significant impact (about 15%). Conventional ECB monetary policy explains about 5% - 10% 
of herding variance for many Eurozone markets, while non-standard monetary policy 
explains a higher percentage of herding variance compared to standard policy for Portugal, 
Germany, Finland, France, and the Netherlands. We also detect an effect of Fed’s policy on 
Eurozone markets: conventional Fed policy seems to have a significant impact on herd 
behaviour volatility for Spain (15.2%), while unconventional Fed policy has an impact on 
herding volatility for Portugal (21.7%) and the Netherlands (15.9%). Note that, the two 
Southern Eurozone markets (Portugal and Spain) that were most severely affected by the 
financial crisis seem to be more sensitive to monetary policy shocks, while Netherlands, 
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despite being a small open economy, it has a large financial sector and is one of the countries 
that experienced a real estate bubble. An interesting observation is that Germany seems to be 
one of the countries with the smallest effect, in all specifications.  
 
4. Robustness tests 
 
One issue that arises at this point is whether our proxy (y*) does indeed capture the impact of 
unconventional monetary policy on macroeconomic dynamics, asset prices, and expectations. 
Note that during the financial crisis main rates had reached their zero lower bound and, thus, 
it is crucial to have a valid proxy for monetary policy during this period. To test the 
robustness of our results, with regards to the policy proxy we use, we re-estimate the results 
in Table 2, replacing our y* variable with the Shadow Federal Funds Rate (see Wu and Xia, 
2016) for the US and the European Central Bank Shadow rate for the EU (see Wu and Xia, 
2017). This rate is estimated using Treasury forward rates up to a 10-year horizon and takes 
into account the impact of policies such as the Quantitative Easing (QE) policy and other 
non-standard policy tools in order to determine an accurate measure of the impact of Central 
Bank policy on economic fundamentals.  
 
Table 4 presents the results of the model when the y* variable is replaced with the Shadow 
Rates (Wu and Xia, 2016; Wu and Xia, 2017). Note that for the US (Panel A) the results are 
virtually identical with the results presented in Table 2, indicating that, for the US, our 
variable captures the main dynamics of Fed’s unconventional monetary policy. For instance, 
when the shadow rate is used, non-standard Fed policy contributes 14.5% to the variance of 
the herding measure (compared to 15.3% in Table 2), while the R2 is 56.6% (compared to 
55.1% in Table 2). For the Eurozone markets (Panel B) there are two notable differences: the 
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contribution of non-standard policy to herd variance in France is much more significant 
(13.8% from 5.3%) while in Portugal is less significant (1.6% from 16%).  This could be due 
to the fact that we include 9 Eurozone countries in order to construct the latent propensity to 
ECB unconventional monetary policy, in contrast to the European Central Bank Shadow rate, 
which covers the whole of the EU.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Another issue that may affect our results is the number of factors included in the model. To 
deal with this issue, as a robustness test, we re-estimate our models but this time we employ 5 
factors in the FAVAR model (rather than 3) according to the Bai and Ng (2002) factor 
determination criterion, although Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) argue that the decision 
relies on the exploitation of the sensitivity of the results to alternative factor numbers. Table 5 
presents these robustness tests results as follows: Panel A reproduces the results presented in 
Table 1 for conventional policy, while panel B reproduces the results presented in Table 2 for 
unconventional policy. For conventional policy (Panel A) we can see that the results do not 
change significantly except for the US, for which the proportion of the US herding variance 
explained falls to 5.8% from 9.6%. For the Eurozone markets the results are more or less 
similar to the results in Table 2: conventional ECB policy shocks explain approximately 
11.7% (from 9.1%) of the variance in the herding measure for Spain, 6.2% (from 5.3%) for 
France, 5.3% (from 4.6%) for the Netherlands, while for the rest countries the proportion is 
much lower, i.e. between 0.1% and 3%. The fraction of the herding variance explained by the 
common factors is (as in Table 2) higher mainly for Southern markets and the Netherlands. 
The most striking difference between the 3 and 5 factor FAVARs is the result for the impact 
of non-standard Fed policy on equity market behaviour herding for the US (Panel B): the 
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FEVD suggests that Fed’s unconventional monetary policy, as captured by the y* variable, 
explains 24.4% of US herd behavior variance (compared to 15.3% in Table 2), which is a 
notable increase. For ECB non-standard policy, the 5-factor model does not produce any 
significant changes, compared to the results in Table 2. As a final robustness test we re-
estimate with the 5-factor FAVAR the results presented in Table 3 (Panel B) and Table 4 and 
arrive at qualitatively similar findings, with minor exceptions; when we replace y* with the 
shadow Fed fund rate and use a 5-factor FAVAR, the effect for the US is slightly reduced 
while for Spain it is increased to about 14%. (these results are not reported here, available 
upon request).  
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In other words, the results of the robustness tests are in line with our original results, with the 
notable exception of the US market where the explained variance of the herding measure by 
Fed non-standard policy increases to 24.4%. Overall, the results presented in this section 
seem to indicate that (i) monetary policy has an impact on equity market herd behaviour, (ii) 
non-standard policy has a much more significant impact compared to standard policy, 
especially for the US and Southern European markets, (iii) there exists evidence of US 
monetary policy spill-over effects with important impact on herding behaviour in Spain, 
Portugal and the Netherlands22, iv) a significant fraction of the variance in herding is 
explained by macro factors. 
 
 
22 Note that the Netherlands is an internationalized market, with a huge foreign investors' component in its 
capitalization. More specifically, ownership of companies held by domestic institutional investors in 
Netherlands in 2007 is less than 10% while ownership held by foreign investors appears to be more than 90% 
(OECD, The Role of Institutional Investors in Promoting Good Corporate Governance, 2011); as a result, it 
would be expected the Netherlands to be more vulnerable to global shocks such as the one of the US monetary 
policy. Indeed, when we test for spill-over effects with y* variable used in order to capture the contribution of 
US unconventional monetary policy to the variance of the common component for the Netherlands, that 
contribution is around 15.6%, one of the highest in our sample (Table 3).   
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5. Impulse Response Functions (IRFs)  
 
The findings discussed in the previous section indicate that monetary policy has an impact on 
equity market herd behaviour; for instance, monetary policy seems to contribute about 15% 
to herd behaviour variance in the US, although its magnitude varies among markets. This 
may have been expected, since shocks in monetary policy often convey significant 
information for market participants. An important question for policy makers, however, is 
whether shifts in monetary policy tend to increase or decrease herd behaviour. For instance, 
herd behaviour, as a response to an important policy announcement, may offset the potential 
effect of the announcement on expectations and asset prices, i.e. on relevant transmission 
channels. This section presents the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) that are obtained from 
the various FAVAR models, to examine the effect of monetary policy on the level of herding.  
 
For the IRFs we follow Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) recursive ordering 
procedure. More specifically, we use a Cholesky decomposition based on the following 
ordering of variables for the model: IP, HICP/CPI, MROr/FFR, Stock_Ret,, ESI/MCSI, HM.  
This ordering was followed by Galariotis et al (2018) as well. The monetary policy shocks 
are identified using a Cholesky identification scheme in the FAVAR model as well, under the 
assumption that the monetary policy variable comes last in the ordering, indicating that it 
affects the unobserved factors, Ft, with only one lag. Nevertheless, we define two categories 
of variables: “slow-moving” and “fast-moving” according to Bernanke et al. (2005). A “slow-
moving” variable is one that is largely predetermined as of the current period, while a “fast-
moving” variable – think of an asset price – is highly sensitive to contemporaneous economic 
news or shocks. We considered alternative orderings, like the one in Bloom (2009) by listing 
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stocks first in the ordering and IP after the monetary rate, but the change in ordering does not 
affect our analysis and conclusions. 
 
Figure 7 presents the response (IRFs) of our Herding Measure to shocks in conventional 
monetary policy. Recall, from section 2, that lower values of the herding measure imply 
higher levels of herding; i.e. lower values of the herding measure imply smaller deviations 
from the consensus (high levels of herding) while higher values of the herding measure 
suggest large deviations from the consensus (low levels of herding). From Figure 7 note that 
the response for Spain and Italy is positive, i.e. a contractionary policy tends to increase the 
level of the herding measure, while for the US we observe a negative response of the herding 
measure. The implication is that, the expansionary policy followed by the ECB tends to 
increase the levels of herd behaviour in the Spanish and Italian equity markets, while the 
expansionary policy adopted by the Fed tends to decrease the levels of herd behaviour in the 
US equity market.  
 
Figure 8, presents the response (IRFs) of our US (Eurozone markets) herding measure to 
shocks in Fed (ECB) unconventional monetary policy as measured by the y* variable: on 
average, we see a positive response, i.e. shocks to non-standard policy result to lower levels 
of herding for most sample markets. Figure 9 presents the herding measures responses after a 
positive shock on the shadow rates: for both France and Italy, the response is positive 
indicating that the levels of herding increase after an expansionary policy adoption, while in 
the US the levels of herd behaviour decrease. Overall, the IRF results indicate that 
conventional and unconventional Fed policies resulted to reduced levels of US equity 




[INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
                                            [INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE]  
 
Figures 10 and 11, present the IRFs for the spill-over effects. Figure 10 presents the response 
of Eurozone markets to Fed conventional policy shocks, i.e. the spill-over effect to Eurozone 
markets. Note that for Spain the response is positive indicating an increase in herding levels 
after an expansionary policy adoption from the Fed. Figure 11 presents the response of 
Eurozone markets to Fed unconventional policy shocks, i.e. the spill-over effect of the y* 
variable to Eurozone markets. Here the response is positive for Portugal, indicating a 
reduction of herd behaviour levels following a shock in non-standard Fed policy, while the 
response is negative for the Netherlands underlining an increase in herd behaviour in the 
respective market. We obtain a similar result when we use the shadow Fed funds rate to 
proxy for non-standard Fed policy (not reported here, available upon request).  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Overall, the results seem to indicate that conventional expansionary policy and non-standard 
policy by the Fed reduces the levels of herding in the US equity market; conventional ECB 
expansionary policy seems to induce higher levels of herding in Spain and Italy, while shocks 
to non-standard ECB policy seem to reduce herd behavior in the majority of the Eurozone 
markets. Conventional Fed policy, however, seems to increase herd behavior in Spain, while 
the unconventional monetary policy stance adopted by the Fed increased the herding levels in 
the Netherlands and caused a decrease in herding behavior in Portugal. Note that our results 
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cannot be due to factors such as differences in gross domestic investment growth rates: the 
annual % growth in gross capital formation for the sample countries (see Figure D1, in 
Appendix D) follows a very similar trend in the sample countries, except for the Netherlands 
for the 2014-2016 period. In other words, there are no notable differences in the trend for the 




Whether monetary policy has an impact on herd behaviour in asset markets is an issue that 
has been neglected in the relevant literature. This paper examines the extent of the 
contribution of monetary policy measures adopted by the Fed and the ECB to equity market 
investor herd behavior in the US and major EU markets. We argue that monetary policy may 
affect herd behavior through its impact on economic expectations and investor sentiment. We 
combine a range of research methodologies to measure monetary policy, herd behavior, and 
their possible relation. For example, we first construct a binary variable based on important 
monetary policy announcements and then employ the Qual VAR model of Dueker (2005) and 
macroeconomic information from our sample countries to transform this variable to a 
continuous latent variable that captures central bank propensity to non-standard monetary 
policy. In a second stage, this latent variable enters a structural FAVAR model in order to 
examine its impact on herd behaviour across countries. To measure herding, we employ the 
measure of Hwang and Salmon (2009), that considers herding as market wide phenomenon 
that evolves over time.  The sample consists of all listed stocks for the NYSE, Vienna Stock 
Exchange, Euronext Brussels, Helsinki Stock Exchange, Euronext Paris, Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange, Euronext Amsterdam, Madrid-SIBE, Milan Stock Exchange, and Euronext 
Lisbon. Overall, the results indicate that conventional expansionary policy and non-standard 
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policy by the Fed reduces the levels of herding in the US equity market; conventional ECB 
expansionary policy seems to induce higher levels of herding in Spain and Italy, while shocks 
to non-standard ECB policy seem to reduce herd behavior in the majority of the Eurozone 
markets. Conventional Fed policy, however, seems to increase herd behavior in Spain, while 
the unconventional monetary policy stance adopted by the Fed increased the herding levels in 
the Netherlands and caused a decrease in herding behavior in Portugal.  
 
On balance, we find that monetary policy seems to have a greater impact over market herding 
in the US compared to Eurozone markets. The differences in the results between the two 
central banks and across countries can be due to several reasons. Firstly, note that central 
banks communicate their policy decisions in different ways. For instance, empirical evidence 
suggests that markets react stronger to communication form the Head of a central bank such 
as the Fed, while to ECB communications which is characterized by a more collegial 
approach, markets react more evenly to Governing Council member statements (see, among 
others, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2007a; Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2007b).  Kohn and Sack 
(2004) present evidence that FOMC statements are significant market movers, while Rosa 
(2008) examines the unexpected components of announcements by the FOMC and the ECB 
and finds a weaker market reaction to unexpected ECB communication compared to the Fed. 
Secondly, the two institutions faced different challenges: whilst the Fed had to deal initially 
with a subprime loan banking crisis (2007-2009), the ECB had to deal with a (multiple) 
sovereign debt crisis (2010-2013), which followed immediately after the respond to the 
global financial crisis. The ECB had to provide liquidity and generally consider issues for 
seventeen (17) different countries (and bond markets), rather than just deal with one 
sovereign security. Another difference is that the ECB, with the LTROs and the SMP 
measures, aimed at a ‘credit easing’ approach, i.e. an approach aiming at also minimizing its 
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own risk, in contrast to the Fed whose Quantitative Easing policies indicated a will to 
undertake credit risk (see for a discussion, Gros, Alcidi, and Giovanni, 2012). Thirdly, 
compared to the Fed, the ECB has only one primary objective (price stability), a narrower 
role as a lender of last resort, and did not use to publish the minutes of the monetary policy 
meeting (in this sense, it may be argued that Fed policies have been more transparent). 
Finally, one has to keep in mind that at some point the ECB had to also consider the survival 
of the single European currency and had to send the appropriate signals to the market: 
“Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And 
believe me, it will be enough”.23 The survival of the US currency was never an issue for the 
Fed during the global financial crisis.  
 
The differences in the results at the country level could be due to the different financial 
phases the Eurozone countries were facing for most of the sample period and, as a result, a 
specific monetary policy measure may have had a different effect in each country. Recall that 
in 2010, Greece was dealing with its worst fiscal crisis in many decades and had to request an 
EU/IMF bailout package, while within the same year a similar package was negotiated for 
Ireland, and in the following year (2011) for Portugal. Yield spreads rose significantly not 
only for the affected countries but also for other Southern European countries; it soon became 
apparent that Italy and Spain were faced with serious problems in their banking systems. 
While many Peripheral Eurozone countries were facing either fiscal problems or banking 
system difficulties, many Core Eurozone countries were much better prepared to deal with 
this crisis and could offer “flight to quality” options for investors. This shows in Financial 
Account trends (see Table A2 in the Appendix) which are in deficit for Spain, Italy, France, 
 





and, Portugal for most of the sample period, while for Core countries (such as Germany and 
the Netherlands) are in significant surpluses.  
    
Another reason for the different results could be the cultural characteristics. Many studies 
find that cultural differences may explain different financial market behavior through their 
impact on financial decision making. For instance, recent studies indicate that investor 
sentiment may have a strong impact on asset returns in countries that are more prone to herd 
or overreaction (Schmeling, 2009). In another study Chui, Titman, and Wei (2010) adopt 
Hofstede's (1984) individualism index and find that it has a positive correlation with 
momentum strategy profitability, while, Chang and Lin (2015) examine the relationship 
between national culture and investor decision making behavioral pitfalls and find that herd 
behavior may occur in Confucian and less sophisticated stock markets, since they place an 
emphasis on public morality and majority behavior.  
 
Overall, an important implication of our results is that market supervisors, regulators, and 
policy makers ought to take into account potential limitations of rational models when 
designing programmes and taking policy decisions. They should also consider the behavioral 
elements of market participant attitudes and psychological and cognitive biases. For instance, 
Hwang and Salmon (2009) find that beta herding is more significant not when markets are in 
turmoil but rather when markets are in a smooth (falling or rising) state. Their evidence 
indicates that during a financial crisis herding weakens (as we also find in this paper) and 
attribute this to the tendency of investors to focus on fundamentals during the crisis, rather 
than herd. The implication is that, if policy makers intend to influence herd behavior, the 
intervention should take place early, i.e. when markets are still in a smooth state, rather than 
during a volatile period or during a bubble period. This, however, may not always be feasible 
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since, decision makers in central banks may not be free of behavioral biases such as loss 
aversion, which could lead to lags or postponements in altering a policy stance (see 
Masciandaro and Romelli, 2019; among others). 
 
Another example of taking into account potential limitations of rational models are the 
behavioral aspects of the risk management procedures established by the central bank of the 
Netherlands (NB) and discussed in Khan (2018) which, among others, aim at recognizing 
behavioral risks early. In addition, central banks should also consider behavioral issues when 
communicating views and policies that aim at shaping expectations; as discussed elsewhere 
in the paper, evidence indicates that even the tone in central bank communication affects 
expectations (Schmeling and Wagner, 2019). Finally, note that behavioral elements have 
been incorporated to models related to central bank policies. For instance, Hommes, Massaro, 
and Weber (2019) propose a model of expectation formation with behavioral elements 
according to which, in addition to the reaction to inflation, central bank reaction to the gap in 
output can lower volatility in inflation; while other models employ certain heuristics to 
forecast inflation which may do a superior job in economy stabilization than monetary policy 
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 Fed Announcements on Unconventional Policy  
 
25/11/2008 Fed Announces Purchases of MBS and Agency Bonds 
16/12/2008 FOMC Meeting: FFTR decreased to 0–0.25% 
28/1/2009 FOMC Meeting, Large Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) announcement 
18/3/2009 FOMC Meeting, LSAP 
10/8/2010 FOMC Meeting, LSAP 
27/8/2010 Bernanke Speech at Jackson Hole 
21/9/2010 FOMC Meeting, LSAP 
15/10/2010 Bernanke Speech at Boston Fed 
3/11/2010 FOMC Meeting, LSAP 
26/8/2011 Bernanke Speech at Jackson Hole 
21/9/2011 FOMC Meeting, LSAP 
20/6/2012 FOMC Meeting 
13/9/2012 FOMC Meeting, LSAP 
22/5/2013 Bernanke Testimony, Tapering Announcement 
19/6/2013 FOMC Meeting, Tapering 
18/12/2013 FOMC Meeting, Tapering 
29/1/2014 FOMC Meeting, Tapering 
11/2/2014 Yellen Testimony 
 







 ECB Announcements on Unconventional Policy  
 
28/3/2008 6 month SLTROs 
4/9/2008 Roll over of the outstanding 6 month SLTROs 
15/10/2008 6 month SLTROs and other measures 
7/5/2009 12 month SLTROs and other measures 
 
(including covered bond purchases) 
4/6/2009 Details for the purchase programme of 
10/5/2010 SMP and other measures 
30/6/2010 Completion of covered bond purchases 
4/8/2011 SLTROs and other measures 
7/8/2011 SMP reactivation 
6/10/2011 12 month SLTROs and covered bond 
8/12/2011 36 month VLTROs and other measures 
26/7/2012 M. Draghi's Speech "Whatever it takes" 
6/9/2012 Details for the OMT 
21/2/2013 Details on securities holdings acquired under the SMP 
2/5/2013 Details of refinancing operations 
22/11/2013 ECB suspends early repayments of the 3-year LTROs 
3/6/2014 Further details of the targeted longer-term refinancing operations 
29/6/2014 Legal act relating to targeted longer-term refinancing operations 
17/11/2014 Unanimous in its commitment to using additional unconventional instruments (M. Draghi, 
speech at the EP) 
18/9/2014 The ECB allots €82.6 billion in first targeted longer-term refinancing operation 
30/10/2014 ECB appoints executing asset managers for the ABS Purchase Programme 
4/12/2014 “Evidently we are convinced that a QE programme which could include sovereign bonds falls 
within our mandate.” (M. Draghi press conference) 
22/1/2015 ECB announces expanded asset purchase programme (FT Front Page) 
18/6/2015 ECB Governing Council takes note of ruling on OMT 
23/9/2015 Eurosystem adjusts purchase process in ABS programme 
10/3/2016 The monthly purchases under the asset purchase programme will be expanded to €80 billion. 
2/6/2016 The Eurosystem will start making purchases under its corporate sector purchase programme 
(CSPP). 
8/12/2016 APP from €80 to billion to €60 billion 
 
Sources: ECB Press Releases (available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/); Falagiarda, et al., M. (2015); 






Variables employed in the EU FAVAR Model  
 
Herding Measures 
Long-term interest rates, Short-term interest rates 
Effective exchange rates 
ECB Commodity Price index; Brent 
Economic sentiment indicator 
Current level of capacity utilization (%) 
GDP and main components (output, expenditure and income) 
Production expectations over the next 3 months 
Households; non-profit institutions serving households 
Disposable income, gross 
Compensation of employees; Property income 
M1, M3 
Production in industry 
Mining and quarrying; manufacturing; electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; 
construction; intermediate goods; capital goods; consumer goods; durable consumer goods; non-
durable consumer goods; Mining and quarrying; manufacturing; Manufacture of food products; 
beverages and tobacco products 
Consumption 
Households; non-profit institutions serving households; Final consumption expenditure of 
households; Final consumption expenditure; Individual consumption expenditure 
Unemployment 
Percentage of active population, Total; Less than 25 years; From 25 to 74 years; Unemployment 
rates by sex, age and citizenship (%), Total; From 15 to 74 years; From 20 to 64 years; From 25 to 
49 years; From 40 to 64 years; From 15 to 24 years; Employment rates by sex, age and educational 
attainment level (%); Average number of usual weekly hours of work in main job, by sex, 
professional status, full-time/part-time and occupation (hours)  
Imports & Exports 
Consumer goods; Consumer goods (excluding transport equipment); Intermediate goods; Capital 
goods; Total 
Labour cost index by NACE 
Industry and construction; Wages and salaries (total); Labour costs other than wages and salaries; 
Labour cost for LCI (compensation of employees plus taxes minus subsidies); Transportation and 
storage; Accommodation and food service activities; Financial and insurance activities; real estate 
activities; professional, scientific and technical activities; administrative and support service 
activities 
HICP 
Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels; Domestic services and household services; Health; 
Cultural services; Accommodation services; Insurance; Industrial goods; Food and non-alcoholic 
beverages; Non-durable household goods; Transport; Communications; Education; Energy  
Equity Market Indexes 
DAX, ATX, BEL20, CAC, IBEX, FTSE-MIB, PSI20, AEX, HEX, S&P 500 COMPOSITE, NYSE 
COMPOSITE, DOW JONES INDUSTRIALS, NASDAQ COMPOSITE, NASDAQ 100, CBOE 











Panel A: Market Capitalisation 
Eurozone Countries  
Included in the Sample  
Eurozone Countries  
Not Included in the Sample 
Market MV Market MV 
Austria 119.74 Cyprus 2.992 
Belgium 344.124 Estonia 2.787 
Finland 254.60 Greece 36.52 
France 2140.09 Ireland 220.71 
Germany 1722.937 Lithuania 3.57 
Netherlands 1103.87 Luxembourg 105.06 
Italy 507.26 Latvia 0.793 
Spain 656.05 Malta 6.39 
Portugal 53.83 Slovenia 6.71 
Total  6902.5 Slovakia 5.02 
  Total   390.5 
Panel B: Average Number of Firms Listed in Sample Countries  
 Average  Min  Max  
Austria 86 62 112 
Belgium 191 111 290 
Finland 92 48 158 
France 642 218 1185 
Germany 590 408 761 
Netherlands 214 98 392 
Italy 230 132 311 
Spain 1856 519 3623 
Portugal 66 23 158 
Panel C: Macroeconomic Indicators 








Bond Yield  
(Y) 
Austria 1.73 4.91 0.09 3.58 
Belgium 1.87 7.98 0.17 2.69 
Finland 1.72 8.74 0.13 3.51 
France 1.47 9.52 0.10 3.73 
Germany 1.39 8.85 0.10 3.30 
Netherlands 1.91 5.12 0.15 3.49 
Italy 1.91 9.36 0.12 4.29 
Spain 2.17 15.85 0.17 4.27 
Portugal 2.06 9.62 -0.02 5.09 
 
Notes to Table D1  
Panel A: Market Value (Market Capitalization in billions of Euro) for the sample Eurozone Stock Markets 
(Q03, 2019; Source: Eurostat, Euro Area Statistics. Available at: https://www.euro-area-statistics.org).  Panel 
B: Average Number of Firms Listed are between 1975 and 2018; source: World Bank. Panel C: descriptive 
statistics of macro variables. For each country, Inflation (INF) is proxied with the rate of change of Harmonized 
Consumer Price Index (HICP All-items), Industrial Production (IND) is proxied with the rate of change in 
producer prices in industry (NACE_R2, Industry; except construction, sewerage, waste management and 
remediation activities), Unemployment (UN) with the seasonally adjusted rate (percentage) of active population, 
and sovereign bond yields are redemption yields on long term (10-years) government (or benchmark) bonds. 








































Austria 53 371.44 912.59 308.54 2014.60 
Belgium 62 293.11 1208.56 174.65 1801.36 
Finland 41 420.72 1044.58 1279.11 5625.54 
France 449 176.82 2299.87 108.13 4666.39 
Germany 342 154.73 1746.71 31.14 231.58 
Italy 81 291.16 1787.52 985.35 28884.96 
Portugal 15 671.16 2253.87 4303.61 21256.89 
Spain 46 1200.15 5305.76 3491.54 38585.88 
US 1430 1498.59 6131.94 7418.74 24410.33 
 
Notes to Table D2  













Gross Capital Formation. Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data 
files. (annual % growth). According to the World Bank (see, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/) “Gross 
capital formation consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level 
of inventories. Fixed assets include land improvements; plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the 
construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, 
and commercial and industrial buildings”.  
Net Financial Account. Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and 
data files. According to the World Bank (see, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator) “The net financial account 
shows net acquisition and disposal of financial assets and liabilities. It measures how net lending to or 
borrowing from non-residents is financed and is conceptually equal to the sum of the balances on the current 




Contribution of Conventional Monetary Policy to the Variance of Herd Behavior  
 
Herding Measure (HM) 
 





Panel A  
US (Fed, Federal Funds Rate, FFR)  
 
US 0.096 0.551 
 
Panel B  
Eurozone (ECB, Main Refinancing Operations, MRO)   
 
Austria 0.001 0.013 
Belgium 0.002 0.078 
Finland 0.004 0.098 
France 0.053 0.231 
Germany  0.007 0.179 
Italy 0.076 0.219 
Portugal  0.015 0.262 
Spain 0.091 0.410 
Netherlands 0.046 0.624 
 
Notes to Table 1  
The Table presents the contribution of convectional monetary policy to the variance of the common component, 
i.e. the Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (FEVDs). The FEVDs are obtained via the estimation of a 
structural Factor-Augmented Vector AutoRegression (FAVAR) model with a two-step principal component 
analysis (Bernanke Boivin, and Eliasz, 2005; Boivin et al., 2009). Initially, a large set of variables and Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) is employed to derive a set of factors that describe the dynamics of financial 
markets. More specifically, 110 and 930 variables are used for the sample market of the US and the EU, 
respectively, such as industrial production, unemployment, producer and consumer prices, short and long-term 
interest rates, capacity utilization rates, money supply, GDP, unit labour cost, main stock price indexes, 
economic sentiment indicators, and imports and exports. We also use global variables (oil price, S&P 500 
Composite Index, VIX-CBOE volatility index, ECB Commodity price index) and aggregate euro-area variables 
(EUROSTOXX 50, Yen to EU exchange rate, EU to UK exchange rate, EU to USD exchange rate, VSTOXX, 
etc). Some time series are quarterly and have been disaggregated into monthly with cubic spline interpolation 
(see, among others, Abbate, et.al. 2016; Lescaroux and Mignon, 2009). The variables (except rates) are in log 
levels and if required differenced to achieve stationarity. All variables employed to estimate the factors were 
standardised (zero mean, unit variance) to deal with the impair factor extraction issue that arises due to the 
different time series scales. For the US we use the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) to proxy for conventional 
monetary policy, while for the EU we use the Main Refinancing Operations (MRO) rate. The model is estimated 
with 3 common factors and 3 lags for the period 2007-2016. The column titled FEVD, reports the fraction of the 
variance of the forecast error, explained by the policy shock. 𝑅2 refers to the fraction of the variance of the 






Contribution of Unconventional Monetary Policy to the Variance of Herd Behavior  
 
Herding Measure (HM) 
 






US (policy proxied by y*)  
 
US 0.153 0.551 
 
Panel B 
Eurozone (policy proxied by y*)   
 
Austria 0.001 0.013 
Belgium 0.010 0.063 
Finland 0.024 0.091 
France 0.053 0.124 
Germany  0.037 0.184 
Italy 0.009 0.172 
Portugal  0.167 0.271 
Spain 0.028 0.298 
Netherlands 0.056 0.627 
 
Notes to Table 2 
The Table presents the contribution of unconvectional monetary policy to the variance of the common 
component, i.e. the Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (FEVDs). The FEVDs are obtained via the 
estimation of a structural Factor-Augmented Vector AutoRegression (FAVAR) model with a two-step principal 
component analysis (Bernanke Boivin, and Eliasz, 2005; Boivin et al., 2009). Initially, a large set of variables 
and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is employed to derive a set of factors that describe the dynamics of 
financial markets. More specifically, 110 and 930 variables are used for the sample market of the US and the 
EU, respectively, such as industrial production, unemployment, producer and consumer prices, short and long 
term interest rates, capacity utilization rates, money supply, GDP, unit labour cost, main stock price indexes, 
economic sentiment indicators, and imports and exports. We also use global variables (oil price, S&P 500 
Composite Index, VIX-CBOE volatility index, ECB Commodity price index) and aggregate euro-area variables 
(EUROSTOXX 50, Yen to EU exchange rate, EU to UK exchange rate, EU to USD exchange rate, VSTOXX, 
etc). Some time series are quarterly and have been disaggregated into monthly with cubic spline interpolation 
(see, among others, Abbate, et.al. 2016; Lescaroux and Mignon, 2009). The variables (except rates) are in log 
levels and if required differenced to achieve stationarity. All variables employed to estimate the factors were 
standardised (zero mean, unit variance) to deal with the impair factor extraction issue that arises due to the 
different time series scales. To proxy for unconventional monetary policy, we use significant Fed and ECB 
announcements related to non-standard monetary policy to construct a binary variable and then use the Qual 
VAR model of Dueker (2005) to transform this binary variable to a continuous latent variable (denoted as y*). 
The Qual VAR model is linked to the single-equation dynamic ordered probit model (Eichengreen, Watson, and 
Grossman 1985; Dueker, 1999) and allows the derivation of the latent variable following the estimation of the 
model with Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) procedures. The model is estimated with 3 common factors 
and 3 lags for the period 2007-2016. The column titled FEVD, reports the fraction of the variance of the forecast 
error, explained by the policy shock. 𝑅2 refers to the fraction of the variance of the variable explained by the 






Spill-Over Effects  
  
Herding Measure (HM) 
 





Panel A  
US Conventional Monetary Policy 
 
Austria 0.001 0.015 
Belgium 0.007 0.062 
Finland 0.023 0.099 
France 0.018 0.125 
Germany  0.004 0.180 
Italy 0.044 0.170 
Portugal  0.040 0.259 
Spain 0.152 0.309 
Netherlands 0.009 0.651 
 
Panel B 
US Unconventional Monetary Policy (y*) 
 
Austria 0.001 0.012 
Belgium 0.012 0.065 
Finland 0.009 0.088 
France 0.052 0.116 
Germany  0.019 0.179 
Italy 0.034 0.180 
Portugal  0.217 0.294 
Spain 0.007 0.296 
Netherlands 0.159 0.647 
 
Notes to Table 3 
The Table presents the contribution of US conventional (Federal Funds Rate, FFR) and unconventional (y*) 
monetary policy to the variance of the common component, i.e. the Forecast Error Variance Decompositions 
(FEVDs). To create the y* we use significant Fed announcements related to non-standard monetary policy to 
construct a binary variable and then use the Qual VAR model of Dueker (2005) to transform this binary variable 
to a continuous latent variable. The FEVDs are obtained via the estimation of a structural Factor-Augmented 
Vector AutoRegression (FAVAR) model with a two-step principal component analysis (Bernanke Boivin, and 
Eliasz, 2005; Boivin et al., 2009). Initially, a large set of variables and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is 
employed to derive a set of factors that describe the dynamics of financial markets. More specifically, 930 
variables are used for the sample markets such as industrial production, unemployment, producer and consumer 
prices, short and long term interest rates, capacity utilization rates, money supply, GDP, unit labour cost, main 
stock price indexes, economic sentiment indicators, and imports and exports. We also use global variables (oil 
price, S&P 500 Composite Index, VIX-CBOE volatility index, ECB Commodity price index) and aggregate 
euro-area variables (EUROSTOXX 50, Yen to EU exchange rate, EU to UK exchange rate, EU to USD 
exchange rate, VSTOXX, etc). Some time series are quarterly and have been disaggregated into monthly with 
cubic spline interpolation (see, among others, Abbate, et.al. 2016; Lescaroux and Mignon, 2009). The variables 
(except rates) are in log levels and if required differenced to achieve stationarity. All variables employed to 
estimate the factors were standardised (zero mean, unit variance) to deal with the impair factor extraction issue 
that arises due to the different time series scales. The model is estimated with 3 common factors and 3 lags for 
the period 2007-2016. The column titled FEVD, reports the fraction of the variance of the forecast error, 
explained by the policy shock. 𝑅2 refers to the fraction of the variance of the variable explained by the common 





Robustness Test – Shadow Fed Funds Rate  
 
Herding Measure (HM) 
 






US (Policy proxied by Shadow Rate; Wu and Xia, 2016) 
 
US 0.145 0.566 
 
Panel B 
Eurozone (Policy proxied by Shadow Rate; Wu and Xia, 2017) 
 
Austria 0.027 0.050 
Belgium 0.009 0.072 
Finland 0.009 0.107 
France 0.138 0.314 
Germany  0.006 0.179 
Italy 0.092 0.245 
Portugal  0.016 0.248 
Spain 0.038 0.314 
Netherlands 0.007 0.627 
 
Notes to Table 4 
The Table presents the contribution of unconvectional monetary policy to the variance of the common 
component, i.e. the Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (FEVDs). The FEVDs are obtained via the 
estimation of a structural Factor-Augmented Vector AutoRegression (FAVAR) model with a two-step principal 
component analysis (Bernanke Boivin, and Eliasz, 2005; Boivin et al., 2009). Initially, a large set of variables 
and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is employed to derive a set of factors that describe the dynamics of 
financial markets. More specifically, 110 and 930 variables are used for the sample market of the US and the 
EU, respectively, such as industrial production, unemployment, producer and consumer prices, short and long 
term interest rates, capacity utilization rates, money supply, GDP, unit labour cost, main stock price indexes, 
economic sentiment indicators, and imports and exports. We also use global variables (oil price, S&P 500 
Composite Index, VIX-CBOE volatility index, ECB Commodity price index) and aggregate euro-area variables 
(EUROSTOXX 50, Yen to EU exchange rate, EU to UK exchange rate, EU to USD exchange rate, VSTOXX, 
etc). Some time series are quarterly and have been disaggregated into monthly with cubic spline interpolation 
(see, among others, Abbate, et.al. 2016; Lescaroux and Mignon, 2009). The variables (except rates) are in log 
levels and if required differenced to achieve stationarity. All variables employed to estimate the factors were 
standardised (zero mean, unit variance) to deal with the impair factor extraction issue that arises due to the 
different time series scales. To proxy for unconventional monetary policy we use the Shadow Rate (see Wu and 
Xia, 2016; Wu and Xia, 2017). The model is estimated with 3 common factors and 3 lags for the period 2007-
2016. The column titled FEVD, reports the fraction of the variance of the forecast error, explained by the policy 












Robustness Test – 5 FAVAR Factors  
 
 
Herding Measure (HM) 





Panel A  
Conventional Policy (See Table 1)  
 
US 0.058 0.638 
Austria 0.001 0.019 
Belgium 0.005 0.079 
Finland 0.012 0.194 
France 0.062 0.261 
Germany  0.010 0.196 
Italy 0.033 0.288 
Portugal  0.026 0.265 
Spain 0.117 0.473 
Netherlands 0.053 0.648 
 
Panel B  
Unconventional Policy (See Table 2)  
 
US 0.244 0.660 
Austria 0.002 0.018 
Belgium 0.010 0.064 
Finland 0.021 0.178 
France 0.076 0.209 
Germany  0.030 0.200 
Italy 0.026 0.285 
Portugal  0.146 0.276 
Spain 0.052 0.381 
Netherlands 0.068 0.647 
 
Notes to Table 5 
The Table presents robustness test results. Panel A reproduces the results presented to Table 1 and panel B the 
results presented in Table 2. The difference here is that the factors employed in the FAVAR model here are 5 
(rather than 3), according to the Bai and Ng (2002) factor determination criterion. The FEVDs are obtained via 
the estimation of a structural Factor-Augmented Vector AutoRegression (FAVAR) model with a two-step 
principal component analysis (Bernanke Boivin, and Eliasz, 2005; Boivin et al., 2009). Initially, a large set of 
variables and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is employed to derive a set of factors that describe the 
dynamics of financial markets. More specifically, 110 and 930 variables are used for the sample market of the 
US and the EU, respectively, such as industrial production, unemployment, producer and consumer prices, short 
and long-term interest rates, capacity utilization rates, money supply, GDP, unit labour cost, main stock price 
indexes, economic sentiment indicators, and imports and exports. We also use global variables (oil price, S&P 
500 Composite Index, VIX-CBOE volatility index, ECB Commodity price index) and aggregate euro-area 
variables (EUROSTOXX 50, Yen to EU exchange rate, EU to UK exchange rate, EU to USD exchange rate, 
VSTOXX, etc). Some time series are quarterly and have been disaggregated into monthly with cubic spline 
interpolation (see, among others, Abbate, et.al. 2016; Lescaroux and Mignon, 2009). The variables (except 
rates) are in log levels and if required differenced to achieve stationarity. All variables employed to estimate the 
factors were standardised (zero mean, unit variance) to deal with the impair factor extraction issue that arises 
due to the different time series scales. For the US we use the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) to proxy for 
conventional monetary policy, while for the EU we use the Main Refinancing Operations (MRO) rate. The 
model is estimated for the period 2007-2016. The column titled FEVD, reports the fraction of the variance of the 
forecast error, explained by the policy shock. 𝑅2 refers to the fraction of the variance of the variable explained 





ECB announcements (shaded) and latent propensity for ECB  
unconventional monetary measures (dash line)  
Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands  
 








Notes to Figure 1 
ECB announcements (shaded) and latent propensity for ECB unconventional monetary measures estimated in 









































ECB announcements (shaded) and latent propensity for ECB  
unconventional monetary measures (dash line)  










Notes to Figure 2 
ECB announcements (shaded) and latent propensity for ECB unconventional monetary measures estimated in 
the Qual VAR model. 
 
 









































ECB (Fed) announcements (shaded) and latent propensity for ECB (Fed) 







Notes to Figure 3 
ECB announcements (shaded) and latent propensity for ECB unconventional monetary measures estimated in 
the Qual VAR model for Germany. Fed announcements (shaded) and latent propensity for Fed unconventional 








































Notes to Figure 4 

















































































































































































































































































Notes to Figure 5 
















































































































































































































































































Notes to Figure 6 





















































































































































































































































































































































Notes to Figure 7 
Impulse Responses generated from FAVAR with three factors and FFR/MRO rate estimated by Principal 





Figure 8  


















































































































Notes to Figure 8 






Figure 9  
IRFs of Herding Measure to shocks in the Shadow Rates  
















































































































Notes to Figure 9 
Impulse Responses generated from FAVAR with three factors and Shadow rates estimated by Principal 
















































































































Notes to Figure 10 
Impulse Responses generated from FAVAR with three Factors and FFR rate estimated by Principal Components 

















































































































Notes to Figure 11 
Impulse Responses generated from FAVAR with three Factors and US y* estimated by Principal Components 
with Two-Step Bootstrap. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
